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Abstract: 
Policy makers in advanced welfare states have increasingly expressed concerns over large 
numbers of working-age people claiming social security support. Accordingly policies aimed at 
reducing the level of ‘benefit dependency’ have gained prominence. However, such policies rest 
on shaky empirical evidence. Systematic collections of national ‘caseload’ data are rare, social 
security programmes overlap and administrative categories vary over time. The internationally 
inconsistent treatment of national transfer programmes provides a further challenge for cross-
national comparisons. This article first identifies and discusses several of these problems, and 
ways in which they may be addressed. It then employs administrative claimant data from six 
European countries as a way of illustrating trends over time and across counties. The underlying 
aim is to explore the scientific potential of benefit recipient numbers as an indicator for welfare 
state change over time and across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the common characteristics of the development of modern welfare states over the past 
twenty years has been governments’ concerns over the number of people in receipt of benefit. 
Whereas in the 1980s the focus had been on containing or reducing registered unemployment, by 
the middle of the 1990s policy makers had become increasingly focused on boosting labour force 
participation as a key strategy for coping with an ageing population. More recently debates have 
gone further and policies have shifted from 'ex-post' remedies that address the consequences of 
being out of work towards 'ex-ante' prevention of people from becoming dependent on a transfer 
income. Most current governments claim that they are pursuing policies aimed at a reduction of 
benefit dependency and, by implication, social security spending. 
 
The onset of the financial and economic crisis has exacerbated such concerns. Rising 
unemployment and tight public budgets have reinforced perceptions of economically 
unsustainable levels of transfer spending. Moreover, if in the past benefits were seen as at least in 
part tackling material deprivation, nowadays they have come to be perceived as creating poverty 
traps, reinforcing social exclusion or undermining the moral foundations of the social contract. 
Activating the working age population and extending the active phase in the life course have thus 
become central tenets of social policy reform. Against this context it comes somewhat as a 
surprise to find that countries rarely collect data on the development of the number of benefit 
claimants (or ‘caseloads’) in any systematic fashion. Obviously, this makes it difficult to assess 
any policies aimed at reducing ‘benefit dependency’. Equally, they make systematic research 
based on claimant data challenging both within and, even more so, across countries. 
 
There are a number of reasons for the difficulty of producing comprehensive claimant data 
across programmes and over time, some of which we will discuss below. Such difficulties may 
also be the principal reason for the absence of theoretically guided empirical social research 
based on benefit recipient numbers. However, the recourse to the more conventional ‘dependent 
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variables’ such as social rights or social spending is faced with serious conceptual and 
methodological problems too (see Clasen and Siegel, 2007). Thus, it seems to us worthwhile to 
at least explore the options which existing and potential claimant data may offer comparative 
social security research. Concretely, building on preliminary considerations (De Deken and 
Clasen, 2011) we assess to which extent caseload trends may function as informative indicators 
of social policy change, possibly complementing social spending or social rights. Prior to 
addressing this key concern, we discuss methodological challenges faced by research based on 
national data (section 2) and international comparisons of recipient numbers (section 3), before 
proposing a categorisation of working age benefits (section 4). Making use of administrative 
claimant data for a collaborative project (Clasen and Clegg, 2011), in section 5 we explore case 
load developments in six countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom) that have followed different pathways, thereby allowing us to identify 
further problems of categorisation and measurement.
1
 We juxtapose caseload trends and the 
development of unemployment and social spending respectively. The aim is to illustrate 
functional equivalence and ‘communicating vessels’ between different working age benefit 
programmes, and particularly the persistence of work incapacity and early retirement schemes as 
reflecting labour market developments. Finally we discuss a series of policy innovations which 
illustrate recent reconfigurations of benefit systems, including leave schemes, the integration of 
unemployment assistance and social assistance, and the combination of social transfers and 
earnings. As we show, all the latter pose considerable challenges for cross-national research 
based on caseload data, while at the same time highlighting the political and administrative 
nature of the construction of benefit dependency. 
 
 
2. National claimant data – some methodological challenges 
One reason for the paucity of comprehensive national data on claimant numbers is certainly the 
complexity of national social security arrangements, with distinctive benefit programmes at 
times catering for the same needs and similar social groups. Some governments have begun to 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank Daniel Clegg, Irene Dingeldey, Marcel Hoogenboom and Jørgen Goul Andersen for 
valuable discussions on caseload data, and for the use of initial data collected for the countries featured in this 
article. 
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address this problem by combining what are functionally similar systems, such as Germany for 
example, where the so-called Arbeitslosengeld II (ALGII) has been created as a basic income 
security scheme for all employable persons outside of unemployment insurance (Clasen and 
Goerne, 2011). Others, such as the UK, are in the process of merging several programmes within 
the forthcoming Universal Credit which is heralded as a ‘single working age benefit system’, 
even though this is to some extent a misnomer since parallel programmes, such as contributory 
unemployment and disability transfers, will remain in place. Thus, even in these two countries 
persons out of work will continue to receive income transfers from a range of schemes that differ 
significantly in terms of generosity and conditionality, but often overlap in terms of risks 
covered. 
 
National programmes also differ in the ways in which respective claimant numbers are 
documented. For example, for most countries it is relatively straightforward to collect claimant 
data on unemployment insurance benefits in a systematic fashion. For other schemes, particularly 
incapacity but also early retirement, the availability of administrative data is more problematic, 
partly due to the existence of parallel systems (e.g. early retirement options within 
unemployment as well as pension programmes; incapacity benefits within social assistance 
schemes; short-term incapacity benefits in the form of statutory sickness pay) and the 
termination of some and introduction of what are often merely slightly different programmes.  
 
Systematically collecting comparable social assistance claimant data is particularly challenging 
for reasons such as divided administrative and financial responsibilities. In Spain, for example, 
social assistance (‘Renta minima’) is administered by autonomous regions and recipient numbers 
cannot be found in national statistics. Moreover, the ‘target population’ of social assistance can 
be very broad (‘general’ social assistance) or narrow (e.g. particular social assistance schemes 
for older people, lone parents, immigrants, etc). In Germany, for example, social assistance used 
to be an encompassing scheme for persons in need irrespective of citizenship, age or labour 
market status. Since the early 1990s separate social assistance (or basic security) programmes 
have emerged for asylum seekers, people of retirement age and, most recently, persons who are 
deemed not to be employable. A further complication is the nature of social assistance as poverty 
alleviating measure, making it impossible in some countries to distinguish between beneficiaries 
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who receive merely social assistance and others who claim additional social security transfers, or 
to distinguish between social assistance and other means-tested (e.g. housing or unemployment) 
assistance transfers, some of which may supplement earned income.  
 
National data collection is also challenged by a blurred distinction between statutory and non-
statutory benefits. Early retirement schemes in the Netherlands are a case in point. Formally 
considered as voluntary agreements these schemes are initiated and run by social partners at the 
level of industrial sectors. Such agreements are quasi mandatory and thus encompassing via the 
practice of administrative extension. Yet it is hard to obtain comprehensive data because these 
schemes are administered by numerous organisations and lack the formal status embodied in 
public early retirement programmes. 
 
3. International comparisons 
The first, and potentially most comprehensive attempt to assemble and standardise national 
administrative data on caseloads across different countries dates back to the late 1990s, when the 
Dutch Ministry of Labour (NEI) commissioned a pioneering study that covered nine European 
countries, Japan and the US for the period 1980-1997 (Arents, et al., 2002). Subsequently, the 
OECD has sought to improve the comparability of this database, and updated the data by a few 
years (OECD, 2003). For illustrative purposes in Figure 1A and 1B we reproduce the OECD 
estimates of working age benefit dependency in six European countries. Figure 1A shows the 
evolution of total working age benefit dependency between 1980 and 2004. Figure 1B breaks 
down the total caseload into four main categories: unemployment, work incapacity (which 
includes sickness and disability benefits); old age (early retirement) and social assistance (which 
includes lone parent benefits).
 2
 
 
                                                 
2  We would like to thank David Grubb of the OECD for providing us with the original datafiles and the update for 
2004. 
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Figure 1A: Working-age benefit recipients as a percentage of the population 15-64 year 
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Figure 1B: Working age benefit recipients in 2004 broken down according to functional category 
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Figure 1A suggests remarkably similar trends of increasing claimant numbers across the six 
countries between 1980 and the mid 1990s, followed by modest declines in some countries. The 
composition of the total caseload indicates considerable differences in the prevalence of different 
benefit categories. Building upon earlier work (De Deken and Clasen, 2011) we have rearranged 
and extended the time series of the NEI-OECD database for a selected group of countries up to 
the year 2011. It should be pointed out that our aims are less ambitious than those of the original 
NEI study. Arents et al. (2002) sought to estimate a total ‘benefit dependency ratio’, i.e. the 
percentage of the population which is dependent upon some kind of benefit, which is an 
endeavour confronted with a number of problems (see below). By contrast in this article we are 
merely interested in tracing caseload trends, i.e. changes in the volume and composition of those 
working-age benefit schemes which can be considered as alternative or substitute for income 
from paid work. Concretely this means that we have not collected caseload data on survivor 
benefits or maternity benefits, and only examined old age benefits in so far as they allow people 
to leave the labour market prior to the statutory retirement age. 
 
The OECD too focussed primarily on the working age population, but, as the NEI study, aimed 
to estimate a total dependency rate. Such an endeavour invites several methodological 
challenges, which, in contrast to what has sometimes been suggested (see for example CESifo, 
2003), have at best only partially been resolved. Even though we are not interested in the total 
benefit dependency rate, and thus avoid some of these methodological problems, in what follows 
(section 5) we have aimed to apply as far as possible the same principles which were adopted in 
the original NEI study. Accordingly, for calculating of claimant trends over time and across 
countries we have identified four major challenges. 
 
The first refers to the problem of partial benefit receipt, i.e. when claimants are employed on a 
part-time basis while concurrently receiving benefits. Partial benefits are often prevalent in 
disability schemes and also exist in early retirement and in unemployment benefit schemes in 
some countries. In order to create greater comparability, it may be possible to transform partial 
benefits into full benefit years. In some countries, including the Netherlands, partial 
unemployment benefits are already expressed in full time equivalents. For other countries where 
such schemes exist, including Belgium, Denmark and France, we applied a factor of 0.5 to 
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beneficiaries of part-time benefits. Similar procedures were used for calculating the case load of 
part-time early retirement schemes. 
 
Second, ‘periodic’ benefits should be, wherever possible and appropriate, expressed in benefit 
years. For recipients of unemployment, early retirement, disability and social assistance benefits 
this was done by calculating the caseload of any particular calendar month. For sickness benefits, 
benefits years we calculated benefit years by dividing the number of days during which a benefit 
was received by the maximum number of days per year for which a benefit can be paid out. This 
differs from country to country, i.e. 260 days in France, 312 days in Belgium and 365 days in 
Germany. Not limited to sickness benefits this problem applies to all schemes in which claimants 
receive benefits for less than a year, or where benefits are not paid for every day of the week. 
One problem is that the information of the number of days benefits are paid in particular 
countries is either missing or not available, another that only data for a particular benchmark 
month might be collected or accessible. In such instances, the NEI and the OECD used either the 
number of beneficiaries in December of the year or ‘the figures of from whatever month … 
available’ (Arents, et al., 2002: 11). Evidently it is impossible to know whether persons who 
received a benefit during the benchmark month claimed benefits also for the rest of the year. 
Moreover, persons who received a benefit during months other than the benchmark month are 
not included, and the assumption might be that these two effects might somehow cancel each 
other out. It should be noted that this is a rather big assumption however, neglecting, for 
example, seasonal effects. In what follows, we choose whenever possible September rather than 
December figures, as seasonal effects are less likely to manifest themselves. Nevertheless, other 
problems of taking monthly figures as an approximation of average annual caseloads remain. For 
example, a reduction in average spells of unemployment periods in one country but not another 
might explain a divergent trends in benefit expenditure and caseloads.  
 
Third, there is a potential problem of double counting. One person should count for no more than 
one (full-time equivalent) benefit claim. In practice however, fragmented national social security 
administrations make it often impossible to implement this principle in countries where the 
simultaneous receipt of different benefits is permissible. As part of their efforts to combat benefit 
fraud, some governments have started to set up integrated databases for separate social security 
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benefits in a single registry. In the future, databases such as the ‘datawarehouse labour market 
and social protection’ of the Belgian KSZ-BCSS system might form a valuable tool in 
eliminating double counts, but the recent introduction of such initiatives prevents the 
development of historical time series. In the NEI study (Arents et al., 2002) this problem 
manifested itself particularly in the case of survivor benefits which are often combined with an 
old age pension, and for old age pensions which are supplemented by social assistance. As we 
are only interested in working age benefits, the problem of double counts is less relevant, except 
for the caseloads of active labour market policies, for example in Denmark. At some point in the 
1990s participants of those programmes started to be reported separately, i.e. in addition to rather 
than included in the caseloads of unemployment and other working age benefits (Goul Andersen, 
2011).  
 
Finally, payments to couples should ideally be individualised. Primarily this problem manifests 
itself in the case of old age pensions and social assistance which is typically paid on a household 
basis. Within the countries we discuss in this article, a breakdown of benefit receipt between 
singles and married couples was not available.
3
 As a consequence in all our six countries the 
total number of persons who are dependent upon social assistance is underestimated. 
 
4. Problems of categorisation 
As indicated, despite the increased political salience of ‘benefit dependency’, it is difficult to 
obtain reliable comprehensive time series of recipient numbers. Moreover, the quality of readily 
available data varies not only between countries, but also within the same country depending 
upon the branch of social security system. At times this seems to be a consequence of the 
fragmented and complex nature of those schemes. For example in the NEI and OECD studies, 
the category of ‘early retirement’ ignored one of the many early retirement schemes in Belgium, 
and thus significantly underestimated the caseload in this particular category.
4
  
 
                                                 
3  As a matter of fact the in the larger sample of 12 countries analysed in (De Deken and Clasen, 2011), only 
Sweden turned out to systematically report a breakdown of benefit receipt between singles and married couples. 
4  In the 1980s four main early retirement options existed in Belgium, two of which were administered by the old 
age pension system: the so-called ‘exceptional bridging pension’ and the ‘early retirement pension’. The two 
others were essentially run within the unemployment insurance administration: the ‘conventional bridging 
pension’ and the ‘statutory bridging pension’ (De Deken, 2011). The OECD failed to take into account the 
former. 
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In the remainder of this article we aim to illustrate shifts in the mix of caseloads of different 
working age benefit programmes over time. For that purpose we distinguish between five basic 
types of programmes providing benefits which allow temporary or permanent exits from the 
labour market. The distinction is based on differences in employment-related behavioural 
requirements: 
 unemployment: beneficiaries of unemployment insurance and unemployment 
assistance are expected to re-enter the labour market; 
 work incapacity: beneficiaries of sickness and disability benefits are exempt from 
labour market participation on medical grounds; 
 early retirement: beneficiaries younger than the statutory retirement age who are 
permanently exempt from labour market participation; 
 sabbatical and leave schemes: claimants are temporarily exempt from labour market 
participation, allowing periods of non-remunerated activity; 
 social assistance: a residual category typically including persons in need and facing 
problems other than, or in addition to, lack of employment. 
 
It should be noted that these analytically relatively clear distinctions have become less explicit in 
recent years. For example, in countries such as Germany, social assistance programmes (for 
some claimants) have gradually been transformed into quasi unemployment assistance schemes. 
In other countries, such as the Netherlands and the UK, eligibility to disability transfers has 
become more employment oriented and subjected to regular ‘work tests’.  
 
As discussed in the introduction, one problem for an international comparison of caseload data is 
the decision to include or exclude benefit programmes based on criteria which are not always 
easy to apply cross-nationally. For example, the NEI study and the OECD claim that they ‘only 
included social security benefits that are regulated by law … regardless of the way they are 
administrated and financed’ (Arents et al., 2002: 8). Based on industry-wide collective 
agreements, which are regarded as ‘private’, the application of this principle led to the exclusion 
of Dutch early retirement schemes. By contrast, in what follows below, we have included Dutch 
early retirement schemes since we did not consider those as private voluntary contracts. After all 
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such schemes are concluded in the shadow of the Dutch neo-corporatist system which ascribes 
collective agreements a status which is akin to legislation and backs such schemes up with a 
procedure of administrative extension (De Deken, 2012). Moreover, it could be argued that the 
NEI justification for the exclusion of ‘private’ schemes is inconsistent since it does not rule out 
non-statutory programmes such as the Danish unemployment insurance system, for example, 
which in essence is voluntary. According to the NEI ‘not including [Danish unemployment 
insurance schemes] would render international comparison difficult because one important 
benefit category … would not be included…’ (Arents et al., 2007: 8). We would agree with this 
statement, but see no reason why it should not be extended to Dutch early retirement schemes. 
 
The creation of meaningful comparable caseload data is not only a challenge at international 
level but also hampered by figures reported by national administrations which appear to be 
unreliable at times. For example, published by the Dutch national (CBS) statistical office, annual 
claimant numbers of early retirement benefit suggest some erratic fluctuations. These tend to be 
attributed to internal revisions and a break in the series in the year 2001 when the number of 
beneficiaries was revised from 299,000 to 371,000 claimants (as illustrated by Figure 2). 
Moreover, discrepancies between trends in claimant numbers and benefit expenditure for the 
respective programme seem difficult to explain. Figure 2 illustrates this by plotting total 
expenditure on early retirement benefits in the Netherlands (left Y-axis) to the total number of 
recipients of benefits (right Y-axis), as reported by the Dutch statistical office. The figure 
suggests that the benefit caseload almost tripled during a 5-year period, but that the respective 
benefit spending remained more or less stable.
5
 
 
 
                                                 
5  To some extent this discrepancy might be related to an increase in part-time early retirement (the CBS statistics 
do not allow the splitting of the caseload of early retirement benefits into full-time and part-time), but the scale 
of the deviation in trends is more likely to be related to either a measurement/reporting problem on the 
expenditure or the caseload side. In one of its publications, the CBS recognised that a substantial part of the early 
retirement plans is implemented by companies and these pension funds remained invisible (Gebraad and Pfaff, 
2006: 2). 
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Figure 2. The development of caseloads and total expenditure on early retirement schemes in the 
Netherlands 1997-2008 
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Source: Statline Database of the Dutch Statistical Office  
 
 
Of course, a discrepancy between trends in the number of recipients and total expenditure does 
not necessarily need to imply a measurement problem. It might be caused by other factors, most 
notably a change in benefit generosity (in terms of level and duration of transfers paid). While 
this is unlikely to have been the case here, we will return to the relationship between policy 
change, caseload and expenditure trends in section 5 below. 
 
As indicated earlier, of interest here are benefits for people of working age, and caseloads are 
thus expressed as a percentage of the population between 15 and 64 years of age. This can pose a 
problem for comparisons of claimant numbers in early retirement programmes. In most (but 
certainly not all) countries the statutory retirement age is still around 65 for men. Women, and in 
some countries also men, used to enjoy a lower statutory retirement age and some still do. In 
principle, whenever making cross national comparisons it would be preferable to consider any 
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pensioners below the age of 65 as in receipt of a form of early retirement benefit rather than 
standard pension. The NEI-OECD project has made such an attempt for France (where until the 
2010 reform the statutory pension system used a flexible retirement age between 60 and 65).  We 
have been able to replicate the NEI-OECD estimates for two more recent points in time: 2008 
and 2010.
6
 The number of French claimants under 65 in receipt of a statutory pension turns out 
be much higher than the number of those in receipt of an early retirement programme, i.e. the 
préretraités and dispensés (older beneficiaries of unemployment benefits exempted from looking 
for employment). Moreover, whereas the latter programmes have effectively been phased out 
since the late 1990s, claims for statutory pensions between 60 and 65 have remained stable.  
 
In other countries however national data make it hard to distinguish pensioners older from those 
who are younger than 65. Depicting Dutch, Belgian and French trends, Figure 3 illustrates this. It 
suggests that comparisons restricted to recipients of early retirement benefits only would be 
inappropriate as a measure of all people who have retired, are under the age of 65 and in receipt 
of a pension. However, a broader measure, e.g. all claimants of a statutory pension under the age 
65, is not without problems either, since this may involve persons who have never been part of 
the workforce. Another challenge is the fact that in some countries, such as Belgium, the 
statutory retirement age for women was raised from 60 to 65 only fairly recently, i.e. in the 
decade after 1997. In other words, proceeding, as we do in Figure 3, runs the risk of exaggerating 
the relative extent of early retirement in France. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse Abrégé Statistique 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
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Figure 3. Retirement below 65 in France compared to the Netherlands and Belgium 1980-2011 
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Sources: (ref De Deken and Casen, 2011); Netherlands: Statline database of the Dutch Statistical Office; France: Abrégé Statistiques and Pole 
Emploi Unistasis; Belgium: National Employment Office (RVA-ONEM) and National Pension Institute (RVP-ONP). 
 
Table 1 summarises various problems of comparing caseloads, the ways in which they might 
affect the magnitude of benefit recipiency and how some measurement problems may be tackled. 
 
 
Table 1: Problems of comparing benefit caseloads  
 
Problem Possible Effects Possible Solutions 
partial benefit receipt increases caseload convert part time benefit into 
full time benefit years, or 
apply weighting factor 
periodic benefits seasonal variations;  
short spells of recipiency 
'neutral' reference month; 
convert days of benefit 
recipiency in benefit years 
double counting increases case load recode programmes 
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household recipiency reduces case load individualise benefits 
functional categorisation underestimates recipiency in 
policy relevant categories 
re-categorise benefit 
categories on the basis of 
behavioural requirements 
non statutory programmes and 
mandating  
underestimates case load in 
countries that use mandating 
instead of statutory 
programmes 
include non-statutory 
programmes 
boundaries of working age underestimates case load in 
countries with lower  statutory 
retirement age 
matching early retirement with 
category of beneficiaries of 
statutory pensions under 65 
 
 
 
5. Exploring and illustrating caseload trends  
Employing updated data from a book project (Clasen and Clegg, 2011) the remainder of this 
article selectively illustrates caseload trends and developments. Of course, problems of 
comparability across countries remain (e.g. in terms of early retirement, as discussed above). 
This is not our concern here however. Rather than aiming to produce a calculation of total 
caseload volumes across countries, our more modest objective is to discuss trends over time 
within single countries. As a first step, this serves as a platform for a reflection on conceptual 
and methodological aspects of comparative research based on caseload data.  
 
Many national social security reforms over the past decade or so have been geared towards 
reversing earlier policies of ‘labour shedding’ during the 1980s and early 1990s, introducing 
behavioural requirements for unemployed and other working age benefit claimants, for example, 
which would encourage shifts from ‘welfare to work’. To some extent the success of these 
policies may be measured in terms of a decline of the caseload of working age benefit schemes. 
However, the decrease in claimant numbers in one benefit programme (e.g. unemployment) may 
lead to a concomitant growth in others (e.g. disability or social assistance), particularly for some 
groups such as low-skilled men (Clasen et al., 2006). Such a ‘substitution effect’ has been noted 
in several countries and can be gauged from some of the graphs below. In what follows we map 
the direction and scale of the change in benefit schemes between 1980 and 2008 in terms of 
number of beneficiaries.  
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Initially however we explore the relationship between trends in caseload and developments in 
social spending. In Figure 4 we plot caseload trends (beneficiaries as a percentage of the 
population 15-64 – left axis) and total expenditure (in US $ at constant 2000 prices at the 2000 
purchasing power parity – right axis) of unemployment benefit schemes in three countries that 
witnessed different national trajectories during that period. 
 
 
Figure 4: Caseload and total expenditure on unemployment benefit schemes between 1980 and 
2008 in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK 
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Figure 4 helps to illustrate that, whatever their respective uses, expenditure and caseload data 
should be regarded as separate indicators since trends in one are not necessarily reflected in 
developments of the other. Looking only at Dutch data in Figure 4, this point does not seem to be 
immediately obvious. In the Netherlands the level of benefit caseload and expenditure on 
unemployment benefit developed in parallel and both are in line with the trend in unemployment 
rates. This is not the case for the other two countries however. In Belgium the number of 
beneficiaries fluctuated broadly in line with the economic cycle and with changes in 
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unemployment rates which remained well above Dutch and British rates during the 1990s and 
beyond. Cross-national differences in unemployment rates are also reflected in the fact that 
British caseload data continued to decline in the early 2000s in contrast to Dutch and Belgian 
claimant numbers which increased for a few years before declining again. Indeed, during the 
period 2002-2005 the UK economy performed marginally better than the Dutch and even more 
so than the Belgian economy, but it is unlikely that it was completely shielded off from the 
economic cycle. Hence the lack of ‘responsiveness’ of the caseload can be assumed to be related 
to changes in eligibility conditions.  
 
For Belgium it is striking that spending continued to rise without showing any of the cyclical 
patterns exhibited by the development of caseloads. This suggests that either unemployment 
benefits became more generous (which is not the case, see OECD, 2011: 40), or that the OECD’s 
spending category is broader than our caseload category, i.e. that it includes beneficiaries who 
are officially not counted as unemployed. Indeed, there are two schemes which might have 
contributed to the spending boom: early retirement (which may account for the increases during 
the first half of the period) and the paid sabbatical schemes that started to take off during the 
second half of the period. The most important Belgian early retirement schemes are financed by 
the unemployment insurance system, and so are the career break benefits (De Deken, 2013). Had 
the caseloads of these three programmes been plotted next to the OECD aggregate spending data, 
the inconsistency would have largely disappeared. In other words, the discrepancy between the 
spending and caseload lines in Belgium is an indicator of what has been termed ‘risk 
reconfiguration’ (Clasen and Clegg, 2011). In this particular case this implies a transformation 
and widening of unemployment benefit into a type of umbrella scheme which incorporates a 
range of out of work benefits for claimants with quite different behavioural requirements.  
 
Turning to the UK it is noticeable that the gap between British spending and caseloads is much 
larger than in Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. This suggests a considerably less 
generous unemployment benefit system. However, it does not seem immediately obvious why 
this gap narrowed so much during the second half of the period. Legislative change is a unlikely 
explanation. The introduction of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in 1996 halved the contributory 
benefit entitlement and thus certainly led to some decline of claimant numbers, but also of 
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expenditure. A more plausible explanation might be the combination between low 
unemployment benefit rates and changes in the composition of benefit caseloads. It can be 
assumed that the job growth after the mid 1980s and again after 1993 benefited particularly 
claimants with shorter unemployment spells. Since caseloads are measured as number of 
claimants in a particular month, this would mean a faster depletion of recipient numbers than 
total expenditure given that the latter is disproportionately determined by long-term benefit 
claimants. Potentially there are other reasons to do with national data reporting and consistency 
over time which would have to be explored further. For the time being the British trends 
illustrate our point that it is not possible to simply ‘read off’ expenditure from case-load date or 
vice versa.  
 
Since countries differ substantially in the ways in which they administratively configure the risk 
of unemployment (see also Erlinghagen and Knuth, 2010) an exclusive focus on unemployment 
benefit dependency would be deceptive. In particular those unemployed who are hard to 
reintegrate into the labour market are often referred to a range of other out-of-work benefit 
programmes, which entail different behavioural requirements. The most often used alternative 
exit routes are work incapacity and early retirement. In absence of a long-term insurance type of 
benefit, hard to employ persons may also end up in social assistance schemes. What complicates 
things is that in some countries the separation between these three out of work statuses has 
become blurred. In Belgium early retirement and sabbatical leave systems are part of the 
unemployment insurance system (and hence form a considerable part of this expenditure 
category in the OECD's Socx database or Eurostat's ESSPROS database). In Germany, 
unemployment assistance (UBII, ALGII) can be claimed not only by those who are registered as 
unemployed but also those who are ‘employable’, even in a minor capacity, as well as those in 
low paid work (Clasen and Goerne, 2011).  
 
The category of work incapacity appears to be less marred by discrepancies between trends of 
caseloads and total benefit spending. In Figure 5 we have plotted those two trends in a similar 
way as in Figure 4 for unemployment. The two sets of lines are fairly parallel within each 
country, but differ cross-nationally. In the Netherlands work incapacity beneficiary numbers 
followed a cyclical development reminiscent of the caseload of unemployment insurance. In the 
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UK there has been a steady rise in caseloads, whereas in Belgium the caseload has remained 
relatively stable.  
 
Figure 5: Caseload and expenditure on cash benefits of work incapacity benefit schemes between 
1980 and 2008 in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK 
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Sources: case load data: (De Deken and Clasen, 2011); expenditure data http://stats.oecd.org/ data extracted on 12 Jan 2011 Social Expenditure 
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(2000), in US dollars 
 
Following unemployment trends, the cyclical pattern in the Netherlands suggests that work 
incapacity benefits throughout the period might have functioned as an alternative form of (long-
term) unemployment benefit. In the UK unemployment declined steadily after 1993 but 
disability benefit receipt continued to rise. This might be due to a number of reasons, including 
work incapacity increasingly covering more than the classic types of physiological impairment 
(see below), as well as policy reforms which appear to have contributed to transfers from 
unemployment to disability support for some groups (Clasen et al., 2006). Another reason may 
be changes in average benefit durations, possibly helping to explain the divergence between 
caseload and expenditure trends in the 1990s. 
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In Figure 6 we provide an overview of the evolution of caseloads of different out of work 
benefits in six European countries between 1980 and 2011 at five year intervals. We have used 
the categorisation as explained earlier.
7
 In addition to our five basic groups (unemployment, 
work incapacity, early retirement, paid leaves and social assistance) we have created further 
categories in order to depict programmes which are hard to classify, or which merit special 
attention. These special categories are beneficiaries of statutory retirement benefits in France 
who are under the age of 65, claimants of UBII benefit in Germany and recipients of working tax 
credit in the UK. 
 
                                                 
7  Hence it is irrelevant out of which national social security branch early retirement, for example, is financed or 
whether incapacity benefits in a particular country is manifest in sickness, disability or social assistance schemes 
(as long as benefits are granted on a medical basis). 
 
Figure 6 Changes in the Caseload Mix in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, France and the UK between 1980 and 2010 
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Note: during the first years that ALMP beneficiaries were reported as a separate category, there probably is a problem of partial double counts between the unemployment category and the ALMP category in Denmark, which 
is why for 2005 and 2010 ALMP beneficiaries in those countries are depicted as a separate category. For Belgium, work incapacity data refer to 2009 instead of 2010. For France unemployment and early retirement data 
refer to instead of 1980; work incapacity refer 2004 instead of 2005, and 2006 instead of 2010; and statutory pensions under 65 refer to 2008 instead of 2005. 
Most striking in Figure 6 is the common pattern of relatively low out-of-work benefit caseloads 
in 1980 and the subsequent growth. Towards the end of the period only Denmark and the UK 
managed to significantly reduce claimant numbers which had peaked during the mid 1990s. The 
Netherlands only recently succeeded in reversing a trend of rising claimant numbers; and in 
Belgium, Germany and France the number of working age benefit claimants continued to rise or 
at best stagnated well into 2011. However, if for Germany one excludes those recipients of UBII 
(ALGII) who are working (the so-called Aufstocker), that country too would show a significant 
decline in claimant numbers for 2010.
8
 Alternatively, if for the UK one includes recipients of the 
working tax credit (which to some extent can be regarded as equivalent to Aufstocker in 
Germany), the British benefit recipiency rate becomes much higher, following a steep recent 
upward trend. This example illustrates problems of comparability and functional equivalents. 
Almost a third of recipients of unemployment assistance (ALG II) in Germany are actually in 
paid work, and consequently these claimants are part of the working age benefit caseload. 
Elsewhere those with similar subsidised types of (generally low paid and/or part time) jobs might 
receive tax funded wage subsidies (tax credits) and are thus, as in the UK, excluded from the 
caseload claimant count (see also below). On the other hand for some countries our caseload 
claimant counts include part-time unemployment benefits and time credit schemes, which in 
effect can also be considered as a form of subsidising part-time work and as such fulfil some of 
the functions of working tax credits.  
 
A cursory analysis of the benefit mix in our six countries suggests some degree of substitution 
between (low) unemployment caseloads and (comparatively high) work incapacity caseloads: 
countries with lower caseloads in the unemployment category tend to be faced with high 
claimant rates in the work incapacity category (Netherlands and Denmark), and the successes in 
reducing the caseload of unemployment benefits concur with increasing work incapacity 
caseloads (the United Kingdom). 
 
                                                 
8  Ideally one should take account of the exact scale of the relevance of UBII benefit in the total income package 
for Aufstocker -- just as we control for the work intensity of those on part time unemployment benefits, part early 
retirement benefits or temporary unemployment schemes. Unfortunately the data do not allow this. 
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This mechanism of ‘communicating vessels’ also becomes evident from a country-by-country 
perspective. For example, Figure 6 shows that the caseload of unemployment benefits in the UK 
halved on a long term basis, while the number of claimants on incapacity benefits almost tripled. 
Such a dramatic increase is not (only) the consequence of the disappearance of certain types of 
industrial jobs, but suggests a broadening of entitlement criteria or an increase in types of work 
incapacity of a psychological rather than merely physiological nature (or both). In Denmark, a 
spectacular decline in the caseload of unemployment benefit between 1992 and 2008 can be 
observed, but the number of beneficiaries of work incapacity benefits, as in the Netherlands, 
remained exceptionally high during the same period. 
 
By contrast, in Belgium the number of unemployment benefit claimants remained high 
throughout, while the caseload of incapacity benefits rose only moderately. In Figure 7 we 
plotted the absolute case load developments of our four basic working age categories as well as 
unemployment levels as harmonised by the OECD. 
 
Figure 7: Changes in the caseload mix in Belgium 1980-2011 
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The transition towards a post-industrial service sector economy in Belgium seems to have been 
facilitated by the use of early retirement, as the number of work incapacity beneficiaries started 
rising only when government began to close down this particular exit route. In addition, since 
2000 there has been a steep increase in the caseload of the paid sabbatical leave schemes (from 
about 70,000 to ca 170,000 cases by 2011). This particular labour supply reduction route seems 
to fit more with the ‘cost disease problems’ of a service sector economy (Baumol, 2001) than the 
labour shedding needs of a de-industrialising economy. The benefits of the Belgian sabbatical 
scheme are financed by the unemployment insurance system, which largely accounts for the 
divergence between the caseload and expenditure trends reported above. 
 
The Netherlands illustrate yet another variation on the principle of communicating vessels. Here 
we see not so much a decline of one type of benefit (unemployment) being compensated by an 
increase in another (work incapacity), but what could be described as a delayed shockwave. 
Trends in unemployment benefits caseload seem to follow the economic cycle, and work 
incapacity schemes follow suit, albeit with a time lag of a few years. It is too early to judge to 
what extent the rise in unemployment following the financial crisis of 2008 will produce a new 
shock wave in work incapacity, but a recent report of the Central Statistical Office suggests a 
dramatic continuous increase of disability benefits for young people (the Wajong scheme): in 
recent years about one out of 12 young adults have been entering the scheme (van Vuuren et al., 
2011). 
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Figure 8: Changes in the caseload mix in the Netherlands 1980-2011 
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In some respects, the Netherlands ‘pioneered’ the use of work incapacity benefits as a way of 
accommodating redundant workers during the era of the so-called Dutch ‘disease’ when the 
country’s labour market was plagued by an exceptionally large scale of inactivity. As Figure 8 
demonstrates, it was only towards the end of the period under study when policy reforms seem to 
have facilitated a reduction of the caseload of incapacity benefit receipt. The steep rise in early 
retirement benefits during the 1990s is a reason to cast doubt on the alleged Dutch employment 
‘miracle’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997) of that decade. While the volume of unemployment 
benefit receipt declined steadily, structural unemployment over time seems to have been 
accommodated initially by the work incapacity scheme, and since the early 2000s by collectively 
bargained early exit from the labour market (bearing in mind the discrepancies we discussed 
earlier between the caseload of early retirement and the spending figures). In other words, these 
early retirement scheme seem to have taken over the shock absorbing role that the work 
incapacity schemes played during the heyday of the Dutch ‘disease’. The steep increase in early 
retirement caseloads between 2000 and 2004 is remarkable. It seems conceivable that this was at 
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least in part a reaction to the Dutch government’s plan to close down the early retirement 
pathway.  
 
Finally, the German case illustrates a number of problems of creating comparable categorisations 
across countries and over time. As Figure 9A shows, German unification in 1990 and the 
collapse of the East German economy manifested itself in steep rises in unemployment, 
incapacity and early retirement caseloads. A change in the registration of persons claiming a 
statutory pension benefit before retirement age masked the scale of the latter for some time. The 
pension reform law of 1992 led to the re-categorisation of persons drawing a standard pension 
before the statutory retirement age, treating early retirees as ‘regular’ pensioners and thus 
reduced the early retirement caseload considerably (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2010:169). 
However, this was masked by the subsequent steady increase of early retirement and persistence 
at a high level until about 2004, which indicates the important role this programme played at a 
time when the German economy was faced with a considerable decline of industrial 
employment, relatively low economic growth and mass unemployment. 
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Figure 9A: Changes in the caseload mix in Germany 1980-2011 
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Figure 9B: Changes in Cumulative Caseloads of Unemployment Benefits in Germany 1980-2011 
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Early retirement, but also incapacity benefits, helped to contain the increase in unemployment 
related caseloads. In Figure 9B we show the shifts between six types of benefits: unemployment 
insurance (Arbeitslosengeld, as of 2005 UBI, ALG I), temporary unemployment insurance 
(Kurzarbeitergeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), which ended in 2005, and 
unemployment benefit II (UBII, ALG II). We also list separately recipients of social assistance 
or, as of 2005, of the ALG II who are in paid work (the so-called Aufstocker) as this can be 
considered more as a wage subsidy than an out of work benefit. Disregarding the latter, the 
figure illustrates the steep decline of the number of people without paid work and in receipt of 
working-age benefit after 2010.  
 
A few remarks need to be made in order illustrate this trend, which in turn is a prime example of 
the need for reflection in the use of benefit claimant data for comparative purposes. First, before 
2005 a certain percentage of social assistance claimants were registered as unemployed. 
However, this proportion varied over time as well as across regions. In the absence of 
systematically collected data we have thus not included unemployed social assistance claimants 
in the total unemployment caseload in Figure 9A, which is therefore underestimated. On the 
other hand, we have included persons in receipt of temporary unemployment insurance 
(Kurzarbeitergeld) which is a temporary benefit for persons in employment whose company 
reduced their working hours for economic reasons, thereby avoiding redundancies. It is thus a 
benefit which replaces lost earnings in part and claimants might be considered temporarily (and 
partially) unemployed. This instrument was heavily used in response to the economic downturn 
in 2008 but also in earlier periods (Möller, 2010; Hijzen and Venn, 2011). 
 
Plotting trends separately Figure 9B indicates that the means-tested unemployment assistance 
became increasingly important during the 1990s to the extent that overall unemployment 
protection in Germany became increasingly ‘dualised’ in terms of caseload numbers, or rather 
heterogeneous if unemployed social assistance claimants are included (see Clasen and Goerne, 
2011). However, in 2005 this changed fundamentally when, in the context of the most important 
reform in German labour market policy since the 1960s, unemployment benefit provision was 
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administratively and institutionally reformed. Of particular interest for us is the merger between 
the former unemployment assistance with social assistance (for claimants deemed to be 
employable) into the new unemployment benefit II (UBII). UBII (ALG II) is more than a simple 
merger however but conceptually new in the sense that it is not (only) a form of unemployment 
protection but wider by (also) covering claimants not registered as unemployed but able to work, 
as well as some groups of persons who are in minor or poorly paid employment that cause those 
workers to fall below the official poverty line.  
 
The introduction of UBII has led to a relative marginalisation of unemployment insurance in 
caseload terms and a dominance of means-tested unemployment support in the modern German 
welfare state. From one perspective it illustrates a form of risk re-categorisation (Clasen and 
Clegg, 2011) and new orientation within unemployment protection, potentially signalling a shift 
from unemployment to 'employability' as the more appropriate caseload category in the future. 
Alternatively it could be argued that the social, political and administrative category of 
'unemployment', which during the onset and development of the industrial era was increasingly 
restrictively applied (Whiteside, 2008) is currently undergoing a major revision. It is these types 
of processes which cross-national research based on benefit caseload data need to take account 
of. Without this the use of social transfer claimant numbers, whether systematically collected or 
not, would at best be minimal and at worst misleading.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article has explored the viability of caseload data for comparative analysis while making use 
of available administrative data to illustrate trends in working age benefit receipt in six European 
countries. The discussion has shown that the relative paucity of internationally available and 
comparable time series is not only due to absence or inconsistency of national data sources. 
There are substantial methodological challenges for research aimed at calculating total benefit 
dependency ratios and comparing those across countries. While certainly of interest, not least 
politically, considerable efforts would be required to overcome problems such as double 
counting, partial and periodic benefit receipt. Another set of challenges relates to identifying 
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benefit categorisations and conceptual boundaries between public and private programmes, as 
well as or functional equivalents between, for example, persons of the same pre-retirement age 
drawing pensions from different pension programmes. Our discussion has shown that what might 
appear to be a fairly straightforward task of selecting, allocating and adding caseload numbers 
often requires concept stretching, omissions of some data or compromises. 
 
This does not mean that caseloads should be ignored. Indeed, in many respects the use of other 
key indicators in comparative social policy research, such as social expenditure, face very similar 
problems. In recent years information on ‘disaggregated’ social spending on different areas over 
time has become more readily available which has allowed more detailed programme-based 
analyses of developments in comparative perspective (e.g. see Castles 2008, De Deken 2013). 
However, depending on research aims the use of these data also requires conceptual deliberation 
and, as with the use of caseload data, rests on contestable assumptions about categorisation or 
functional equivalence. This is underlined by the, at times, considerable degree of discrepancy 
between what is supposed to be comparable data at international level (see De Deken and Kittel, 
2007).  
 
Neither does this mean that caseloads do not offer ‘added value’. The discussion has shown that 
trends in spending and caseloads of the same programme do not always co-vary. This can be due 
to changes in employment or unemployment structures, or because of policy reforms which 
affect the two indicators differently. Provided that methodological problems can be adequately 
addressed both types of data are therefore distinctive and important indicators of welfare state 
change. In any case, given the political saliency and concern over ‘benefit dependency’, social 
researchers should be clear about the options for and limitations of investigating social security 
claimant numbers over time both within and across countries. 
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